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NOTE AND COMMENT 
WII.t.$--R£rocA'l'IoN BY JUDICIAL L!:Gtst.ATioN.-Wills and their revocation 
as we know them are peculiarly the result of the actions and reactions of our 
common and statute law. We are sufficiently familiar with statutes, declara-
tory of the common law, in derogation thereof, and creating entirely new 
principles of law. We also know law the result of no legislative act. Wbat-
ey~ may or may not be admitted about court-made law, we see the undoubt-
ed fact that the great body of our law is the outgrowth of_ d~isions applying 
to new conditions principles of law found in analogous cases, whereby the 
common law is able to adapt itself to our changing conditions, and keep step 
with the march of progress. We are not unaccustomed to judicial interpre-
tation that practica1Jy nullifies statutes, or gives to them an effect that would 
surprise the legislators originating them. We do not so often come upon pretty 
open contests between court and legislature, cases of judicial usurpation re-
sulting in rules of law flatly contradictory to the words of the statutes. 
A notable instance is found in the law as to revocation of wills, and an 
·excursion through a certain line of cases is interesting not merely for this, 
but also for the curious mistakes of judges and text writers in studying and 
applying the precedents relied upon to establish the rule. Feudal require-
ments long delayed the right by will to dispose of lands, and there was not 
much personalty to bequeath. Such as there was might be bequeathed very 
informally, and by resort to uses a praCtlcal way was found to make what 
amounted to testamentary disposition of lands. After 1540; Statute 32 Henry 
VIll, this could be done by last will and testament in writing. No form or 
signature was required; and personalty was disposable as before. See Butler 
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and Bakers case, 3 Coke 25, 31, ;6 Eng. Rep. 684. and footnotes. For the 
purpose of this note this statute is of small moment The Statute of Frauds 
and the Statute I Vict. are the great statutes of wilts, and the former, more 
largely than the latter, has furnished the model for Ameri~ statutes. 
Hence cases under the Statute of Frauds are of greater ·interest in most 
American jurisdictions. 
The Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Charles II, c. 3, required devises to be "in 
writing and signed by the partj so devising." They must also be duly at-
tested and subscribed by witnesses. Bequests of personalty might still be 
qral, but nuncupative wilts were strictly limited, though no formal require-
ments were made for written wills of persooalty. The Statute I Viet re-
quired the same formalities for the testamentary disposition of real and 
personal property. Frauds and perjuries had occurred not merely in setting 
up wills, but also in attempting to prove revocation by word of mouth. The 
Statute of Frauds, therefore, provided in section VI that no devise, nor any 
clause thereof, should be revocable otherwise than by certain destructive 
acts to the instrument. or by certain specified instruments declaring the same. 
To make doubly sure, the section says this over in another way, declaring 
that "all devises and bequests(?) of lands and tenements shall remain and 
continue.in force" until revoked in one of those specified ways. And finally,· 
for treble assurance the section concludes, "any .former law or usage to the 
contrary notwithstanding." · This is said, though doubtfully, to have been 
drawn by CHANC£1.I.Oll NOTTINGHAK, as the result of a very shocking case 
of perjury and subo~ation of perjury in proving revocation of a will, a 
case tried before him the year previous, 1676. Cole v. Mordaunt, in a note 4 
V~. 196, also discusSed in Prince v. Hazleton, 20 Johns. ,502 (CH. K!NT). 
· It was doubtless supposed that by these very positive words ~e door 
was bolted, barred and sCaled against the admission of any other maqner of 
revocation, and so it seemed to BAJION Pi:uor. Not so to his brother. barons, 
who soon found that no revocation "otherwise than by the ways specified" 
had left as before revocations implied 'by law ! Christopher v. Christopher, 
Dick. 445, and so it was held in K~bel v. Scraftolf., 2 East 530, per Lu. 
~JIOUGH, and after great consideration by all. the judges of the three 
courts of Westminster-Hall in Marston· v. Roe d. Fox, 8 Ad. & El. 14. per 
TINDAi. C. ]. (1838). Parliament, seeing how the attacking forces of" the com-
mon law had made inroads on the undoubted territory embraced by the ·Sta-
tute of Frauds as t.o revocation, took counsel of strategy, and determined to 
provide for revocation by changed circumstances, but tb do it in· its own 
way, and so indubitably that the c0urts should not venture "another attack. 
It did ·not require both marriage ·and. birth· of a child, but by the Statute 
I Viet., c. :26, 1837, it enacted that, I. "Every will made Dy a man or woman 
shall be revoked. by '1is or her marriage" (except in certain cases under a 
power); 2. "no will .shall be revoked by any presumption of an intention on 
~e ground of ~ alteration of circums~c~s," and 3. "no will or codicil, or 
any part thereof shall be revoked otherwise. than as aforesaid, or" by other 
means specified, these being mainly as named in the Statute of Frauds. Thus 
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were the courts forbidden ·to invent any more methods of revocation. And 
they bve obeyed, as will later appear; with very absurd results in scime 
cases. But for these; Parliament and not the courts may be blamed. 
Such was the iaw as to wills made from and after Jan. I, 1838. In 18s8, 
the case of Goods of Cadywold, came on to be decided by ~t most learned 
judge of probate law, Sm Cusswa.i. CusWEU.. In that case one T. Cady-
wold made a will devising all his rcat estate to Elizabeth Soundy, bis intended 
wife. for life. and then for the benefit of any children they might have liv-
ing at bis decease. or born in due time aft~ds, and the residue of bis 
personal estate to bis intended wife absolutely. Thomas and Elizabeth car-
ried out their marital plans, and in cour14? of time he died, leaving her and 
four children surviving him. Then the question arose whether his widow, 
and executrix, could have probated this will which bad been made for this 
very purpose. And the Q. C. Dr. Addams who bad been instructed to move 
for probate of this paper, on the strength of Marsto11 v. Fox., npra, "appre-
ltended it could not be granted." With this agreed Sm CussW£I.J. CaEssWJtU., 
who said, "It seems at first sight rather startling to say that a will like the 
present. executed in contemplation of marriage*** should be revoked by 
such marriage." but on the cases cited so the law stands. · 
Now it does not appear that Sir Cresswell was relying on the positive 
provision of 1 Viet. that marriage revokes a will, and be should not. for 
though the WC was.decided in 18s8, the will W!lS made in 1828, and therefore 
·did not fall under 1 Viet. When we tum to the ·cases cited we find that 
Marstor. v. Fox, npra, decided that notwithstanding th~ Statute of Frauds, 
co11tra, the courts bad let in another manner of revocation, i. e., by prcsump-
1ion of law from a change in the testator's circumstances. This chan;Je was 
marriage and birth of a child or children. On the strength of this prcsump-
1ion, which was a rigid-though court-made-presumption of law, and de-
pended not .at all on the intent of the testator, this will of T. Cadywold, 
which he bad made for the express purpose of providing for bis wife an~ 
children, by the very fact that be bad the wife and children was utterly re-
voked I Even while dtey were doing it the courts admitted very great dif-
ficulty in· reconciling their work with the positive words of the Statute (Lom> 
EUENBOROUGH, C. J., in Kmebel v. Scraftoa, 2 East 541), and some cases baYe 
gone the length of calling it usurpation of legislative power, Hoitt v. Hoitt, 
63 N. H. 475. Nevertheless, the English courts firmly stood on the ground 
they bad seize_d, and the American courts have generally adopted the same 
rule. Bnuls v. Wilkins 4 Johns. Cb. 506, per Cu. KENT, Warre11 v. Bea;ls 4 
Gray 162, Per SHAW C. J. . 
But to return to th!'! Cadywold c;ase. As it ~ decided twenty years after 
this last etiict of Parliament bad changed the statute law, it was not pro-
bable many, or any cases, of wills under the old Statute of Frauds would 
raise that precise question again. We arc not surprised therefore that the 
Cadywold case bas not been much referred to by the courts, though it bas 
been very much cited by the text writers, sometimes as applying to I Viet., 
which is, of course. a great error, e. g. The Laws of England, The Earl of 
Halsbury, Vol. 28 p. 562. The curious· thing is that the editor of an edition 
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of Jarman's classical Treatise on Wills, which appeared shortly after the 
Cadywold decision, cites this case, p. 125, with the remark that the decision 
in Kenebel v. Sera/Ion-, 2 East 530, was overlooked by Sir C. Cresswell, and 
his decision, therefore, cannot be taken as an authority. And Redfield in his 
Law of Wills, which appeared soon after, fell into the same crr9r, and re-
ferred approvingly to this footnote in Jarman. But the reportS of the 
Cadywold case all show Kenebel v. Sera/Ion not only was not overlooked, but 
it was on the strength that case that the widow was advised to try to probate 
the will. Sec rSw. & Tr. 34. ZJ L. J.P. 36, 6 W.R. 375. But Dr. Addams, 
Q. C., in following his instnictions to move for its probate, apprehends that the 
law being as •held in Marston v. Roe d. Fox. 8 A. & E. 14. it could not be 
granted. Evidently neither he nor Sir C. Cresswell read ejther of those cases, 
since both Kenebel v. Sera/ton and Marston v. Fox confine the rule of revo-
cation to cases in which there is a failure to provide for the wife and child, 
and expressly hold that the will is not revoked if it makes provision for both. 
That is precisely what this Cadywold will was intended to do, and hence there 
should have been no revocation under the rule of Marston v. Fox, npra. 
Dr. Addams refers to another case, viz., Israeli v. Rodon, 2 Moore P. C., 51, 
which was an appeal from the Court of Ordinary in Jamaica. This was a 
case decided in 1839, in which this same .Dr. Addams, not then a Q. C., ap-
peared, to argue for a revocation of the will. The Privy Council, speaking 
through Sir Herbert Jenner, agreed with him, not on the ground that there 
was no provision for the wife and child, but that~e provision was not ade-
quate- enough to repel the presumption of revocation. That the estates must 
have been considerable would appear from a quarrel the widow had with the 
trustees over the disposition of the produce. lsraell v. RodoK, 2 Moore P. C • 
.p. This adequacy ·of provision was reading a new element into the rule, not 
found in MarstoK v. Fox, npra, nor in other'cases. The opinion has much 
to say of the intent of the testator in making his provisions, and this regard 
for intent is quite contrary to the settled rule, which rests not at all on any 
supposed intent in the given C?-Se, but on a positive presumption of law. The 
opinion of the Governor and Ordinary of Jamaica in deciding the case in the 
Court of Ordinary is interesting. It appears that Henry Rodon made a will 
in England in favor of his sisters and a brother. He then went to Jamaica 
and soon married and made settlement of his real estate, but not .of his 
personal, which was considerable, UPOn his wife for life, and afterwards to 
his child or children. He died soon, leaving his wife enciente, and a post-
humous daughter was born, the respondent in the case The Governor 
thought it clear when the ·will was made there was no contemplation of mar-
riage. ''The question then comes, whether his deed of settlement gave a 
secure ( ?) and sufficient (?) provision for his child, or whether the best 
part of· his property (that is, bis personal estate) should· go away from his 
child to half-sisters • • • There is a cliild, now eighteen months olcj, entirely 
dependent on her mother for every present and future benefit, during such 
mother's life, and that mother, a young woman about twenty-five years of age, 
and having recently married again." The Governor was not a lawyer, but 
under the circumstances of this case it seemed to a layman that though he 
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might "possibly be wrong in the law of the case," he was positiVe that be was 
not wrong in equity. Not impugning the affection of the mother for her 
child, he notes no proof on the second marriage of provision for the child, 
so as to make her independent of the stepfather, who may have married the 
widow "on some consideration of her property acquired by Rodon." This 
ingenious suggestion that the provision for the child must be immediate, and 
not dependent on the death of the mother, does not seem to accord with the 
cases reviewed in MarsfO# v. Fos-, StlP,CJ, but the.facts in this case are so 
different from those in the Cadywold case, as to make it no authority, for in 
the Rodon case the will took the property away from the widow and mother, 
while in the other it carried the entire property to them. 
Before leaving this maze of errors we may notice that this whole doctrine 
of revocation by implication of law from change of circumstances, seems to 
have been imported from the Roman law, and is not indigenous to the Eng-
lish. That marriage and birth of a child should revoke a wilt is said to be 
triced to Overinlry v. Ovn-b11r:;, 2 Show. 242 (1682), 89 Eng. Reports 915 and 
footnote, and text writers wrongly, but quite generally, cited this case as 
authority for the doctrine. Jarman Treatise on Wilts, •123, Underhill on the 
Law of Wilts, Sec. 239, Rood on Wilts, Sec. 37S. Woerner, The American 
Law of Administration, Sec. 54- It is true that the Court of Delegates did 
borrow the notion from the civilians, who regarded a wilt which failed to 
provide for children as inofficioswm testamentum, but the Overbury case 
said not a word abont marriage. To make a wilt: "and afterwards have 
children" and die is the case there put. But the English courts soon held that 
there must be both marriage and birth of children. L_'ll{J!J v. Lt1gg, 2 Salk, 
592 (16g6), Doe d. White v. Barford, 4 M. &.S. 10 (1815). It is not strange 
to find the· ecclesiastical courts thus influenced by the Civil Law, see Sheplserd 
v. Sheplsn-d, note to ST. R. 51, but we have seen how in Marston v. Fox, .ni-
pra, the entire bench of common law judges at Westminster approved the 
doctrine. And American cases and statutes have generally followed the· En-
glish. Balduiin ·v. Spi;iggs, 65 Md. 373, Durfee v. Riscls, 142 Mich. 504. Mc-
Larrsey's Estate, 153 N. Y. 416. · 
The question was fully considerM by the Supreme Judicial Court of Mass-
achusetts in Ingersoll v. Hopkins, 170 Mass. 401. The court erroneously 
cites Goods of Cadywold, swpra, as authority for the English interpretation 
of the Statute of l Viet., passed nine years after the Cadywotd wilt was made, 
and holds that under the Massachusetts statute a wilt made in contemplation 
of marriage is revoked by realizing on that contemplation, and that the Mass-
achusetts statute, which, unlike the English, provides· for an exception if 
"it shalt appear from the will itself that the wilt was made in contemplation 
of such marriage," requires that this contemplation shall appear on the face 
of the will, and all evidence not derived from ·the will itself is excluded. On 
this it may be remarked, 1. That the Cadywotd case cited is no authority as 
to a will under l Viet.,. 2. That the only other case cited as interpreting the 
English statute, Otway v. Sadleir, 33 L. T. I{>, was an Irish case also reported 
in 4 Ir. Jur. N. S. w. in which the Irish court said, "I cannot introduce any 
qualification into the 18th Section which I do not find in the Statu~· This 
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rule of interpretation, if it had been followed in Marston v. Fo-x, would have 
forbidden any revocation by presumption under the Statute of Frauds. It 
may be noted in passing that Wills, Part VIII, p. s62 of the Earl of Hals-
bury's Monumental.Laws of England, vol. 28 (1914), lays down the same 
construction of the statute, and cites only these two cases, Goods of Cady-
1vold, supra, which is no authority. for a will under the Act 1 Viet, and this 
Irish case. On turning to the list of contributors it appears that Part VIII 
was· contnoutcd by the late Irish Master of the Rolls, and a member of the 
Irish bar. They have, of course, interpreted the Statute as Parliament must 
have intended, but with results that arc quite absurd when the will, like the 
Cadywold will, gives all to the wife and "children. We may agree with Sir C. 
Cressw~l, that not only at first sight, but at every other sight, this result 
seems, not only rather but altogether startling. The positive language of 
Parliament in 1 Viet may require this conclusion as to wills made after 
Jan. 1, 1838, but in Massachusetts the courts have ·not that defense, for, 3. 
the Massachusetts stattite d<>cs not apply this i:ule of revocation when it ap-
-pcars from Ute will itself "by fair inference from its provisions as applied to 
the parties and the; subjects to which it relates, that the will was made in 
contemplation of the marriage that was subsequently solemnized," -to use the 
paraphrase of the trial judge who had upheld the will. The high court found it 
must "appear" on the face of the will. The fact that the will gave to the 
contemplated wife all the property and made her one of the executors was 
not enough, because it required evidence outside the will to show that a will 
giving all to Mary Alice Payson, who within a year became his wife, was 
ma~e in contemplation of marriage. This was a strict and narrow construc-
tion, and in its results so absurd as to defeat the obvious intent of the statute 
without furnishing a single safeguard against fraud. It is always necessary 
to go outside the will to determine the identity of devisccs and legatees. A 
gift to my only son, John, requires evidence alivnde to identify John. The 
fact that a man gives all his property to Mary Alice Payson, "single woman," 
ought to be appearance enough on the face of the will to prevent his marriage 
to her soon after from defeating his purpose in making the will. It is suggest-
ed in Francis v. Marsh, 54 W. Va. 545, that a man can always prevent this re-
sult by republishing the will after marriage. This, however, is cold comfort to 
the wife whose husband has died in ignorance of any such absurd require-
ment of the law. We remark on this case, 4- That fortunately the cases are 
few where the testator would fail in his will to make some reference to his 
intended marriage. There seems to have been no case in Massachusetts since 
Ingersoll v. Hopkins {18g8), and that case has never been cited on that point 
in any other jurisdiction This is in part at least due to the fact that the 
wording of most statutes would not permit such a result, the Michigan sta-
tute, to take one instance; providing in express terms for "revocation implied 
by law from subsequent changes in the conditions and circumstances of the 
testator." If we- may judge what the Michigan court would. do from its 
language in a late case under this Statute, D11rf ee v. Risch, 142 Mich. 504 
(1905), we may conclude it would follow Marston v. Fox and not Goods of 
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Cadywold. This language is, ''The reason of the law is the essence and soul 
of the law." 
In threading this maze of errors this note is already too long'. It may 
close without further notice of the present state of the law as to the revoca-
tion of wills by marriage, than a reference to two recent ~ reviewing the 
subject, Hoy v. Hoy 93 Miss. 732. and annotations in 25 LR. A. N. S. 182 
{I909), Herzog v. Trust Co. 6-J Fla. 54, Ann. Cas. 19I7 A ·20I, and annotations 
~~ &C~ 
Al.n:NATION oF CoNTIN~NT ~vAINDOS. The recent case of Bisby v. 
Walker, 169 N. W. 4/q, decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa November 23, 
I9I8, is an interesting instance of an all too common lack of appreciation 
and understanding of the very fundamentals of pre>perty law. . 
Under the will of her grandfather B became entitled to a contingent re-
mainder {at least the court treated it as such) in certain lands; the contin-
gency upon which her taking depenaed was her being one of the surviving 
children of her mother at the time of the death of the life tenant, the tes-
tator's widow. During the continuance of the prior estate and therefore 
while her remainder was canlingent B executed several mortgages, some de-
scribing the mortgaged property by metes and bounds and some as an her 
"right, title, and int~est'' in the devised lands. These mortgages all con-
tained covenants for title or recitals indicating an intention to convey "abso-
lute title in fee simple." While the remainder was. still contingent. and after 
the execution of all of the mortgages but one B went through bankruptcy and 
received the usual discharge. It was held, undoubtedly correctly so, that the 
mortgages were enforceable liens upon B's interest in the devised lands after 
the death of the life tenant, B having survived her. 
At common law contingent remainders being considered in the nature of 
mere possibilities (sec Fulwood's Case, 4 Co. 641>, 66b; Ltnnpefs Case, IO Co. 
~a) were deemed incapable of alienation by a conveyance at law, "otherwise 
than by way of cstoppcl by fine (or by a common recovery, etc.)" Ft.Uta:, 
CoNTING!NT ~XAIND6S, *p. 537. As to the operation of cstoppel in these 
cases see Doe d. Christmas v. Olwer, IO B & c, 181. If, then, in Iowa con-
tingent remainders such as B had in the principal case are incapable of con-
. veyance except by the operation of an estoppcl, it was necessary for the court 
to consider whether the mortgage deeds were such as to raise an estoppcl 
and the effect thereon af a discharge in bankruptcy. Considerable space is 
takeµ up by the court in concluding that the mortg:lge deeds were such as to 
raise an estoppeL It is then concluded that the discharge in bankruptcy did 
not affect· the inurement of the after acquired title, though no attention is 
given to the exceedingly interesting and nice point argued by PRolltssoR 
GRAY and disposed of by Mr. JusTICS HoLK£S for· 1}1e court in Ayer v. Phila-
delphia & B Face Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84. The bankruptcy discharge, so it 
was said, could not affect the mortgagee's rights, for the mortgage lienJ! had 
fastened upon the property more than four months prior to the petition in 
bankruptcy I 
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Coptingent remainders in England were made alienable by 8 & 9 Viet. c 1o6 
(1845) "the provision being a sweeping one. It is provided that "a contingent, 
an executory and a future interest, and a possibility coupled with an interest · 
***whether the object of the gift or limitation of "such interest or possibility 
be or be not ascertained* * * may be disposed of by deed." In this country 
statutory provisions to the same effect though generally not so explicit are 
common. See STIMSON, Av.." S'l'. LAW, "§1420. In Michigan the provision, es-
sentially the same as in ~cw York, provide5 that "Expectant estates are de-
scendible, devisable and alienable, in the same manner as estates in possession." 
Howai.'s STATS. (211d ed.) 1o657. The remarkable thing about the principal 
case is that in Iowa it has been settled that the statute providing that "Every 
conveyance of -real cState passes all the interest of the grantor therein, unless 
a contrary intent can be reasonably inferred from the terms used," enables a 
contingent remainderman to make effective conveyances of the remainder. 
This was settled fa M cDorsald v. Bonk, 123 Iowa 413; in whicll the remainders 
in question ·were contingent in the same way ~ in the principal case. The 
M cDorsald case was cited by the court at the outset, with the statement that 
"The mortgages, then, were valid when executed,'' which statement of coU!"se 
is in kecPing with the observation, referred to above, that the discharge in 
bankruptcy did not displace the pre-existing liens created by the mortgages. 
Without realizing that they had thus decided the case in the first two sen-
tences stating the law applicable to the facts, the court went on to a consid-
eration of the matter of inurement of after acquired title apparently being 
led utray by several earlier Iowa cases, which are cited, in which the ques-
tion of inurement by cstoppel was vitally important for the reason that the 
conveyances or mortgages were made at a time when the grantor or mortgag-
or had no interest in the premises, not even a contingent remainder. 
It is held where contingent remainders are alienable that a mortgage there-
of may be foreclosed even before the contingency is determined. Peoples' 
Loon and Exchange Bonk v. Garlington; 54. S. C. 413. And this would seem 
entirely proper. · R. W. A. 
W1TNESs-CoKPSTENCY oF AN Al.LoPATH1c ExP£RT IN TH£ FI£I.D oF HoKo£-
OPATBY-0PINION ON VERY FACT TB£ JURY >I.UST Dt'l'ERHINt. VonSickle v. 
Doolillle, (Ia., 1918), 16!) N. W. 141, was an action for malpractice against 
a physician of the homa:opathic school of medicine. Upon the trial, a 
physician of the allopathic school was called, and after testifying that he 
was unskilled in the science of hom~athy, was allowed to testify 
that the treatment shown to have been given to the patient by defendant, 
would produce no physiological effect, and that proper treatment required 
the giving of such medicines as would produce such effect. This_ was held 
error upon ~e ground that the defendant was called to treat the patient as a 
homceopathic physician and that his only obligatidn was to exercise such 
care and skill as was common to practitioners of that school of ~edicine, and 
the wituess having been shown to be unskilled in the science ot medicine as 
practiced by that school, was not qualified to speak as expert in the field in-
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volvcd. This would seem to be the only ruling which would avoid a fruitless 
controversy in the court room between two schools of medicine whose apostles 
would hesitate to agree on so simpl.! a proposition as that the normal man 
has one and not two livers. 
It doubtless is one answer to such an action that the patient got what he 
asked for, if he got treatment according to the standards of the school to 
which the practitioner called belonged, and cannot complain that the result 
was not what he had hoped, ·and the court seems to have adopted this view. 
But suppose the P.atient at the time of the treatment is non compos mentis 
and cannot make the request for treatment; that the physician, discovering 
his condition, gives the treatment out of a spirit of humanitarianism only, 
and the patient recovering, brings his action to recover for claimed malprac-
tice. Would he be entitled to recover, if he could satisfy a jury that the care 
and skill exercised was not that common among practitionCflS of medicine in 
that community? Would it be enough to defeat such attion that he did ex-
ercise that measure common to practitioners in his particular school, that of 
homte0pathy? Docs the liability depend at all upon th~ fact that in the one 
cas,c the patient engaged for homte0pathic treatment and got it, and in the 
other did not, and got it? Unless the physician is to be penalized for acting 
on his humanitarian impulses it would seem reasonable to conclude that if 
the physician used the care and skill common to practitioners o"f a school 
which the law recognizes and licenses, he should be held harmless. The rec-
ord docs not indicate that the Good Samaritan's nostrum was diluted quite 
to the extent of that shown to have been used in this case, but he seems not 
on~, not to have been condemned for bis act, but to have been considered 
worthy of imperishable memory. 
One paragraph of the opinion reiterates the fallacious doctrine that ~ 
expert witness cannot express an opinion upon the very question which the 
jury must determine by its verdict. Why not? That the only question a jury 
has to determine in a particular case is whether fact X exists haS" never been 
thought to be a good objection to the testimony of A, who has had oppor-
tunity to personally observe whether it does exist, that it docs or docs not 
exist. His testimony is received because it bas a tendency to assist the jury 
tc;> a correct determination of the question at issue,· that of the existence of 
fact X. 
For precisely the same reason should we say, that if the jury after .having. 
heard the testimony ~ to what were the circumstances accompanying the 
death of A and finding what they were, is unable to tell what these condi-
tions mean, it is proper to call one who is able to say that they mean that A 
died of typhoid fever, or that he died of arsenical poisoning, as the case may 
be? As in the previous case the testimony is taken because it furnishes just 
the information the jury lacks. Fenwick v. Bell, l C. & K. 312; Poole v. Dean, 
152 Mass .. 589; Snow v. R. Co., 65 Mc. 231; Littlejohn v. Shaw, 159 N. Y. 188; 
Western Coal&: M. Co., v. Berberich, 3(J C. C. A. 364- V. H. L. 
